feminist constructions

Series Editors: Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Sara Ruddick, and Margaret Urban Walker

Feminist Constructions publishes accessible books that send feminist ethics in promising new directions. Feminist ethics has excelled at critique, identifying masculinist bias in social practice and in the moral theory that is used to justify that practice. The series continues the work of critique, but its emphasis falls on construction. Moving beyond critique, the series aims to build a positive body of theory that extends feminist moral understandings.

Moral Psychology

Feminist Ethics and Social Theory

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Trust and Terror

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In 1986 Annette Baier wrote:

> Trust is always an invitation not only to confidence tricksters but also to terror-
> ists, who discern its most easily destroyed and socially vital forms. Criminals, not
> moral philosophers, have been the experts at discerning different forms of trust.
> Most of us notice a given form of trust most easily after its sudden demise or se-
> vere injury. We inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an atmosphere and no-
> tice it as we notice air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted. (1994b, 99)

Thanks in large measure to her essay "Trust and Anti-trust" and the work it
generated, philosophers can now claim some expertise at discerning and an-
alyzing trust in its various forms. Where, prior to "Trust and Anti-trust," there
were at most a few scattered remarks to be found in the philosophical liter-
ature, nowadays there is a whole menu of theories for someone interested in
philosophical perspectives on trust to choose from. All new encyclopedia
projects contain entries on trust, as do indexes in books on political theory,
moral philosophy, and epistemology.

Yet despite all this theoretical activity, it is terrorists and not moral philoso-
phers who remain the experts at discerning trust in its various forms. Or
that's what I want to argue: reflecting on the aftermath of terror, we find a
kind of trust that has been largely overlooked in the philosophical literature,
a literature shaped by the claim that trust is a three-place relation. That trust
is a three-place relation is now common ground even among otherwise com-
peting accounts of trust.[1] However, while the aftershock of terror does sig-
nificantly change the landscape of three-place trust relations, the power of
terror lies in its ability to shake what I shall call our *basal security*. Basal

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security is not adequately theorized in three-place terms and thus has not been adequately theorized in contemporary philosophical works on trust. Three-place analyses are thus able to offer at most a partial map of trust and its varieties. To see that this is so, it is first necessary to explore the ways in which three-place analyses divide up the theoretical terrain.

THE LANDSCAPE OF THREE-PLACE TRUST

Three-place analyses of trust have chiefly been concerned with the question of whether and how to separate trust from reliance. On the simplest three-place analysis, trust just is reliance. On trust-as-reliance accounts, the second-place holder B of the schema "A trusts B to do Z" can be filled by agents, natural and artificial, or by things, such as machinery and ropes. Trust-as-reliance accounts are the least restrictive of the available accounts; indeed, that is their problem. While such accounts conform to ordinary linguistic usage, which is after all very loose, they identify too heterogeneous a class of dependencies to support useful generalizations and thus do not provide a useful classification for the purposes of social scientific or other theorizing. One can choose to trust the people-smuggler, shady though he seems, rather than face a life of bare subsistence in a refugee camp. But such wary and reluctant dependencies will be avoided where possible and, even when undertaken from necessity, will be accompanied by the continued search for ways of reducing risk. The claim, commonly made by social scientists, that trust is a form of social capital that reduces transaction costs is false if trust is understood as mere reliance. We need to be able to distinguish those reluctant dependencies undertaken from necessity from those dependencies willingly undertaken. Only in dependencies of the latter kind will the truster be willing to forgo close monitoring of performance and to assign discretionary powers to the trustee, both of which are necessary if transaction costs are to be lowered.[2]

In "Trust and Anti-trust," Baier offers the following account of the difference between trust and reliance: "What is the difference between trusting others and merely relying on them? It seems to be reliance on their goodwill toward one, as distinct from their dependable habits, or only on their dependably exhibited fear, anger, or other motives compatible with ill will toward one, or on motives not directed on one at all" (1994b, 98–99). But if trust-as-reliance accounts are too commodious, goodwill-based accounts, though they identify a centrally important *kind* of trust, seem too restrictive as a statement of what trust relations in all their varieties have in common. We are often content to trust without knowing much about the psychology of the one-trusted, supposing merely that they have psychological traits sufficient to get the job done (Blackburn 1998a). Indeed, Baier's own expressibility test for the moral decency of a trust relation assumes that trust relations can be grounded on psychological traits other than goodwill. According to that test, trust relations are morally decent only if they could survive reflective awareness of the qualities on which the reliance is based:

> A trust relationship is morally bad to the extent that either party relies on qualities in the other which would be weakened by the knowledge that the other relies on them. Where each relies on the other's love, concern for some common good, or professional pride in competent discharge of responsibility, knowledge of what the other is relying on need not undermine but will more likely strengthen those relied-on features. They survive exposure as what others rely on in one in a way that some forms of stupidity, fear, blindness, ignorance and gullibility normally do not. (1994b, 123–124)

But if this is to be a test for the moral decency of trust, rather than a test for whether an instance of reliance is trust, then it must be assumed that trust relations can be founded on features of the one-trusted's psychology other than goodwill.

A broader conception of trust is explicitly articulated in the post–"Trust and Anti-trust" work: "I define it as accepted vulnerability to another person's power over something one cares about, in the confidence that such power will not be used to harm what is entrusted."[3] Call this broader conception of trust, trust-as-confidence. I think this conception is very nearly right as an account of what different kinds of three-place trusting relations have in common and in virtue of which it is correct to call them all *trust* relations. But it does require some further modification. Consider therapeutic trust; that is, trust undertaken with the aim of bringing about trustworthiness.

For example, a mother might trust her teenage daughter to look after the house for the weekend even though the daughter has failed in the past to meet such responsibilities with trustworthiness. The mother might think that by displaying her trust and not arranging to have the daughter stay at a friend's house or to have the neighbors keep an eye on the place, she can elicit trust-responsiveness in her daughter.[4] The mother might lack confidence that the daughter will respond to trust with trustworthiness on this occasion, but she hopes that, eventually, her trust will be repaid with trustworthiness and for now she is willing to accept vulnerability (e.g., complaints from the neighbors and a huge cleaning task) in the hope that a policy of trusting, consistently displayed, will bear fruit in the long run. The mother might have no *expectation that* the daughter will look after the house well—the past track record makes such *predictive* expectations unwarranted. But the mother does have *normative* expectations *of* the daughter that she look after the house well.[5] Should the daughter fail to do so, she will respond with resentment and reproach; she will feel let down.[6]

Normative expectations and the reactive attitudes that express them provide the solution for how to distinguish trust from reliance in another class

of cases as well. Consider Immanuel Kant's neighbors who, the story goes, rely on the regularity of his afternoon walks to tell the time.[7] On a trust-as-confidence account, Kant's neighbors count as trusting him for the time: they are vulnerable to changes in his schedule misleading them; they are confident that he won't mislead them. However, unless they have come to think that they and Kant have an unspoken agreement that he will be the neighborhood's clock, they do not form normative expectations of him. Intuitively, it seems that they do not trust him for the time, either, though they rely on him for it.

This discussion suggests the following modified account of three-place trust. Trust is accepted vulnerability to another person's power over something that one cares about, where (1) the truster forgoes searching (at the time) for ways to reduce such vulnerability, and (2) the truster maintains normative expectations of the one-trusted that they not use that power to harm what is entrusted.[8]

In the typical case, the truster will forgo searching for ways of reducing vulnerability on account of having confidence that the one-trusted will in fact prove trustworthy, but in cases of therapeutic trust such confidence may be lacking. This account is restrictive enough to identify a class of reliances that sustain the kinds of generalizations about the role of trust in facilitating social and economic relations, but is commodious enough to include reliances not based on assumptions about overly specific features of the one-trusted's psychology.

Trust, a species of reliance, can itself be divided into varieties. Following a suggestion of Baier's, we can divide trust into varieties according to the "varieties of vulnerability and the varieties of grounds for not expecting others to take advantage of it" (1994b, 100). An important class of cases—trust in friendship—will concern personal vulnerabilities of various kinds, accepted on the basis of assumed goodwill. But other cases are covered, also—trust in business transactions, in professionals, postal carriers, and plumbers can all be accommodated within this general analysis. Sustaining trust will require different functional virtues depending on the variety of trust involved. Indeed, since we don't want to proliferate varieties of trusts according to just any difference in vulnerability or grounds, so that, as well as friendship-trust, we have plumber-trust, physician-trust, John-trust, and so on without limit, we will want to individuate the relevant shifts in vulnerabilities and grounds according to relevant differences in the kinds of functional virtues required to respond well to such vulnerabilities. Baier argues that among the functional virtues required to sustain trust on the part of the truster will be a willingness to forgive and tact and good timing in holding to account; while among the virtues of the one-trusted will be a willingness to use discretion appropriately.[9] We can think of these as general virtues of truster and trusted, that is, virtues required for trust in all its subvarieties.

Specific varieties of trust will have their own characteristic additional virtues. For example, consider vulnerability to professional misconduct or incompetence; that is, vulnerability that arises from persons failing to fulfill role-specific trust. These vulnerabilities are typically accepted on the basis of assumptions about professional competence and about the well-functioning of institutional structures of training, accreditation, and audit. Functional virtues of the one-trusted include conscientiousness and appropriate self-trust—the one-trusted must neither overestimate nor underestimate their competence lest they be, on the one hand, timid in exercising discretionary power or, on the other hand, practice outside their ability. Now consider vulnerability to the abuses of intimacy. These vulnerabilities are typically accepted on the basis of assumptions about the other's care or love for us. Barbara Herman argues that among the functional virtues for sustaining nonabusive intimate relationships will be a proper regard for the (perhaps emerging) autonomy of the dependent other (where this dependency may be either mutual or asymmetric, as it is between parent and child).[10] In this way, then, for the purposes of classifying varieties of trust, vulnerabilities can be divided into kinds according to the functional virtues required to respond appropriately to them.

It seems that we have near enough to a complete taxonomy of trust in all its varieties, or at any rate, we have a framework for constructing such a taxonomy and, once the work begun by Baier on the functional virtues of truster and trusted is completed, we will have fully mapped the terrain. But this appearance is misleading.

BASAL SECURITY

Survivors of random attacks frequently describe themselves as living in different worlds before and after the attack and describe the change in trust terms.[11] In many cases, the difference between these worlds cannot be captured in terms of different *beliefs* held pre- and postattack. Before an attack, a survivor might have been able to tell you the statistics regarding the prevalence of such attacks—she might have been able to cite the Federal Bureau of Investigation statistic that, in the United States, rape occurs on average once every two and a half minutes.[12] We know (if we are lucky, only secondhand) that shootings, stabbings, hijackings, and bombings happen, and we know that such terrible things *could* happen to us, even if we are not able precisely to estimate the probability that they will. We know, in an abstract way, that the world in which we live is risky and that we are vulnerable—in ways too numerous to count—to the possible malice, ill will, or outright evil of other agents. But it is one thing to assent to the proposition that the world is risky, and it is another thing to have one's day-to-day experience of the world shaped by a pervasive awareness of one's own vulnerability.

Even those fully trained in risk assessment and therefore not likely to make mistaken intellectual judgments about risk can nonetheless find themselves fearfully focused on a risk they judge to be statistically low.[13] This can lead to what appears to be irrational behavior when, in order to avoid those risks that are the object of anxious focus, people willingly take even greater risks. Recent examples of this include all those who bought air tickets after the September 11, 2001 attacks but then failed to show up for their flights despite knowing that the statistical risk of automotive death and injury far exceeds the risk of flying. Whether it is irrational to face a greater risk in order to avoid a risk that has become the focus of anxiety is a question to which I will return.

Disruptions to past patterns of three-place trust and dissonance between intellective risk-assessment and willingness to trust are also common among rape survivors. There, one often sees wild see-sawing. A woman might find herself unable to follow through with her plans to go out with friends, though she judges that doing so poses hardly any risk. The next day, that same woman, perhaps disgusted at what she sees as her own timidity, might decide to hitchhike to California, something that prior to the attack she would never have imagined doing.[14]

Dissonance between intellective risk-assessment and dispositions to trust are commonplace and can work in either direction, allowing one to trust even though one judges (or would judge) it a poor risk and leading one not to trust though one judges (or would judge) trusting a good risk. Our habits of trusting, whether habits of overlooking or of focusing on our vulnerabilities, determine whether risk will be salient to us and thus contribute to the pattern of our three-place trust. These examples of dissonance between intellective judgment regarding the degree of risk presented in a situation and our willingness to actually trust in the face of such-and-such a degree of risk, and the way that this dissonance is played out emotionally, so that we are anxious beyond what we take the situation to merit, or calmly oblivious to risk we know on some level is there, support the postulation of an underlying, affectively laden state that is explanatory of our willingness or otherwise to enter into particular three-place trusting relations. Call this underlying state basal security.[15]

What sort of state would be sufficient to explain the observed dissonance between, on the one hand, intellectual judgments of risk and, on the other hand, emotional responses to risk and willingness to enter into three-place trust relations despite risk? How, that is, should basal security be characterized? If we suppose that agents have an unarticulated, affectively laden, interpretive framework that they use in framing choice situations concerning vulnerability to the actions of others, then we can explain how dispositions to trust can come apart from intellectual assessment of risk. To attribute an unarticulated, affectively laden, implicit, interpretive framework to an agent is to

attribute to this agent a set of dispositions of salience, interpretation, motivation, and affect. Differences in these frameworks and the dispositions that constitute them give rise to differences in the way the world is experienced. Low basal security is characterized by tendencies to scan the environment for signs of risk and danger. An agent suffering from low basal security is vigilant, has heightened awareness of her own vulnerability, and experiences situations as containing risk. This awareness of vulnerability is often explicit, but it can be implicit. It is implicit if experienced as mediated through awareness of risk, where the risk itself remains the sole focus of attention; it is explicit if the vulnerability is experienced directly or becomes the focus of attention when experienced as mediated through awareness of risk.

With low basal security, risks are not only salient, they engage the agent both emotionally and motivationally—they are experienced as reason-giving. The agent is aware of her own vulnerability as a source of anxiety, and risk is strongly negatively valenced. Low basal security can lead the agent to have higher than average estimates of the objective risk provided by a situation, but it need not. That is, low basal security need not lead to a shift in explicit risk-assessment judgments. But it does change the perceived *practical significance* of a given degree of risk. Whereas a given degree of risk might not enter at all into the practical deliberation of someone with high basal security, or if it enters it might enter as challenge rather than threat, someone with low basal security lives in continual awareness of her own vulnerability. Thus, someone with low basal security is likely to interpret a situation as containing reasons for self-protective action when someone similarly situated but with higher basal security would not. In this way, basal security contributes to determining the agent's practical orientation toward vulnerability and safety.

Basal security is a folk psychological notion, posited to explain dissonance between risk as judged and risk as experienced, both emotionally and practically. It draws further support from reports of survivors of violence who describe the changes in how they experience the world pre- and postattack in trust terms and from the folk psychological practice of characterizing persons as trusting or distrusting, a practice that imputes relatively stable dispositions to persons regarding their practical orientation to risk in their interactions with others. Folk psychology is, however, answerable to empirical evidence and folk psychological categories earn their keep only on the supposition that they support useful generalizations and do not posit mechanisms that we have no good reason to suppose exist. There is evidence from cognitive psychology for the interpretative and affective dispositions that I claim characterize basal security. The literature on generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) supports the supposition that anxiety can operate at the preattentive stage of processing. Persons with high trait anxiety tend to focus on potential threats and to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening. It seems they do this

even before being explicitly aware of the threatening stimulus. The stimulus thus comes to their attention already interpreted as threat.[16] There is also strong support in the empirical literature for positing interpretive schemata and for the role of such schemata in emotional disorders.[17]

Confining basal security to interpretative frameworks concerning vulnerability and risk as these derive from *human agency* might be thought to be unwarranted. Patients with GAD are prone to excessive worry.[18] Some of the worries might concern the agency of other persons, others might not. Why think that we are likely to have interpretive schemata specific to the agency of others? There is much folk psychological evidence to support the claim that we respond differently to harms caused by persons than to harms caused by animals or natural causes and that our responses to harms caused by human agents are likely to differ according to whether we take the harm to have arisen from ill will or from misadventure. Not only are our normative responses different (as we would expect them to be), our emotional responses are different. We are more likely to be psychologically devastated by harms caused by active ill will on the part of other agents than by other kinds of harms. Susan Brison reports being advised, "Don't think of your assailant as a human being. Think of him as a wild animal, a beast, a lion" (2002, 86). Baier observes that "incompetence is more easily remedied than ill will" (1994c, 135). There is also suggestive empirical evidence that post-traumatic stress is more likely to follow sudden man-made violence than natural disaster (Schwarz and Perry 1994).

The causal paths that affect the development of basal security are likely to be many and various. There is empirical evidence of heritable tendencies toward anxiety disorders; thus, genes may play a role.[19] There are likely to be individual differences that result from character and personal history, and to be historical, social and cultural differences resulting from differences in group experience and in cultural assumptions about what constitutes an appropriate degree of vigilance. Part of the work of creating healthy levels of basal security falls to parents who must "strike the right balance in the child between undue trust in others and her own ability to do things safely with others, on the one hand, and undue timidity, fear and suspicion, on the other" (Baier 1994d, 188). Powerful lessons in trusting are likely to be nonverbal and to occur through the Humean mechanism of emotional contagion rather than through verbal instruction. Indeed, whatever parents *say* about how risky or safe the world is, how likely or unlikely we are be harmed by others, the child is apt to pick up directly on the parents' own emotional responses. In this way, our parents' traumas can become our own. Children of Holocaust survivors report acute, ongoing awareness of how fragile and vulnerable is all that they care for and, in consequence, often develop rules and rituals for managing their own perceived vulnerability, whether or not they intellectually assent to the reality of that vulnerability.[20]

If the story of how robust levels of basal security are created and how they are repaired once damaged is complex and as yet inadequately understood, the story of how they are damaged is much simpler. We are all of us sometimes let down in our trust. We typically dust ourselves off and continue as basically trusting persons. Often enough, a bad experience leads to no change at all in our trust—we forgive and trust the person again. Baier is surely right to identify a willingness to forgive breaches of trust as a central functional virtue of trusters. Trust can be sustained among fallible human agents only if there is willingness to forgive. Baier is also right to observe that it takes judgment to know what can be forgiven, when, and what cannot. Rules and maxims can offer but little guidance (Baier 1994c, 151). When forgiveness is possible, we can retain our trust in our trust and need see no reason to retrench or revise our three-place trust.

Some betrayals lead to revisions in our practice of trust. They lead us to distrust our trust and to seek to regain trust in our trust by revising our policies and habits of trusting. We assume partial responsibility for the betrayal and take it to signal some fault or excessive optimism in our trust. Accordingly, we retrench in our three-place trusting, aiming to regain metatrust by economizing on first-order trust. This retrenchment can be with respect to a particular person, a kind of person, or a kind of vulnerability. Thus, I might resolve never to tell John my secrets again, never to tell colleagues my secrets, or to be more circumspect in the telling of secrets, period.

But some betrayals shake our metatrust while leaving no identifiable ways of retrenching on our first-order trust so as to regain trust in our trust. These are the betrayals that, if serious, shatter basal security. If the betrayal is serious, and if I can identify nothing in my first-order trust that was unwise or overly optimistic, then I cannot attribute part of the fault of betrayal to my own practices of trust. I come face to face with my own vulnerability and with the inability of even the wisest of trust practices to protect me from the harm that others can inflict. Rather than confront this vulnerability, I might try to self-attribute blame on the most slender of grounds, "If only I hadn't accepted a drink from a friend of a friend, if only I hadn't talked to him; I probably gave him some sort of encouragement. I'll be sure never to do that again." In cases of rape, these attempts at regaining a sense of agency and control after an attack can look like the result of misogynist victim-blaming ideology. In New York State, rape crisis organizations lobbied hard to have their volunteer counselors protected by legislation that restricted legal access to professional counselors' case-notes because they feared that a defense team could use the survivor's own words to deflect blame from the perpetrator onto the victim. As Brison writes, "it can be less painful to believe that you did something blameworthy than it is to think that you live in a world where you can be attacked at any time, in any place, simply because you are a woman" (1993, 13; 2002).

When an attack could not have been predicted and is severe, the agent's basal security is at risk, as metatrust cannot be restored through revising first-order trust practices. A really efficient terrorist campaign works by attacking basal security. The randomness of terrorist attacks suggests that terrorists understand that inability to predict and thus protect against attack magnifies the effectiveness of their fear campaigns. If the feminist analysis of rape as a male-protection racket is even partly correct, then rape wins hands-down as the all-time best-designed terror campaign.[21]

If terrorists can succeed in shaking basal security, they can radically transform behavior. To whatever objective expected disutility might attach to a choice, is now added a sure-fire subjective penalty, the penalty of anxiety created by the ongoing awareness of the risk that one is taking. Thus, even if we continue to *judge* that the risk is within parameters that permit rational trusting, it may nonetheless *not* be rational for us to choose to trust, given the anxiety that is now associated with trusting. Terrorists do not merely alter our perception of risk, making it more salient to us, they also alter our payoff matrices by adding subjective penalties to objective risk. In this way, they change the choices that it is *rational* for us to make. A well-designed terrorist campaign can thus be remarkably cost effective as our own response to that terror magnifies its effects. Those who bought air tickets and didn't show were wrong to accuse themselves of irrationality. Had they traveled, they would have traveled in fear. It might be objected that those who chose not to travel, or to travel by car instead, were irrational insofar as their subjective emotional response to the risk was out of proportion to the level of risk, objectively considered. If they could choose among the three options, travel by car without anxiety, travel by plane with anxiety, and travel by plane without anxiety, then indeed they would be irrational to choose to travel by car. But, having been made so dramatically aware of their vulnerability in air travel, the option of traveling by plane without anxiety was foreclosed to them. The combined negative payoff of risk and anxiety made air travel rank lower than car travel. Nor can we simply will our responses to follow in proportion to our intellective assessment of risk. The fact that the mechanisms of interpretation and salience operative in anxiety work at a level below our conscious awareness explains what we know from experience: anxiety can be very hard to control and is not subject to direct control by the will. Although we may be able to will to trust in the face of loss of a sense of security, we cannot will the sense of security to return. In the final part of the chapter, I return to the question of what level of basal security is appropriate.

I have argued that reflecting on the aftermath of terror brings into focus a form of trust that has been largely overlooked within the philosophical literature on trust, focused as it is on three-place trusting relations. We need to postulate basal security in order to explain dissonance in our judgments of risk and in our willingness actually to trust on the basis of such judged risk, and we need to postulate it to explain why the world should be experienced as radically different after an attack than it was before an attack, even in those cases where the agent does not revise her beliefs about how objectively risky the world is.

Two objections, coming from opposite directions, seem salient. One might wonder whether basal security is properly called a form of trust; and one might wonder whether basal security has three-place structure after all and so is in fact already adequately theorized within available accounts of three-place trust. To the first concern, I haven't much to say. In a way, it doesn't matter whether you accept that basal security is itself a variety of trust or whether you think that it underlies and is explanatory of varieties of trust. There's nothing much to be gained from this sort of semantic dispute. What matters is that basal security *matters* and that we don't fully understand three-place trusting, its patterns, disruptions, and how to repair them, unless we understand basal security and how to repair *it*. But it is worth remembering that people who have experienced sudden loss of basal security describe their experience in trust terms, "My trust in the world was shattered." Also, it is perhaps significant that what we have in mind in dividing persons into kinds as "trusting" or not is not captured by some tally of the number or variety of three-place trusting relations in which they enter or would enter (how do you count those anyway?), but rather by the kind of practical and affective orientation toward risk and vulnerability that I call basal security.

The next objection comes from the opposite direction. Perhaps basal security is a form of trust, but a form that we are already equipped to analyze. What I've been describing as a change in a fundamental practical orientation toward one's own vulnerability can be captured, the objection presses, by changes in the agent's set of three-place trusting relations, actual and counterfactual. U.S. citizens no longer trust their government to be able to protect them from attack; travelers no longer trust the safety of the aviation industry; investors no longer trust the stock exchange to give reasonable returns on their investments and so on. The rape victim no longer trusts men not to attack her.

It is true that changes in basal security almost certainly lead to changes in the landscape of three-place trusting and, as important as the changes in actual entrustings, are the changes in possible entrustings under various hypothetical circumstances. Nor need the picture be entirely negative here. United by the common bond of their experience, rape survivors can form relationships of trust with each other that are of an intimacy that would previously not have been possible at all, or not with such speed. Likewise, after September 11, 2001, united in their shock and sense of facing a common, if poorly quantifiable, risk; New Yorkers formed trust relations with each other that were previously unimaginable. Indeed, it is on account of the impact it

has on three-place trusting that understanding basal security is vital. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that all that matters here can be captured in three-place terms. A loss of basal security gives rise to different experiences of the practical significance of vulnerability and risk—risk and vulnerability are salient and highly negatively valenced. This change in how the world is experienced, being a change in, among other things, how reasons are perceived, typically produces a change in behavior. We can, though, imagine an agent who overrules those experiences and refuses to let them direct her behavior. There would be a psychic cost to doing this, but it seems in principle possible; thus, what has changed cannot be captured in merely three-place terms. Undoubtedly, also, there can be significant changes in three-place trust without a change in basal security. For example, a woman might realize that the patterns in her three-place trust of men have been shaped by the false but once common belief that "nice girls" are not raped. She might lose this belief and modify her trusting practices accordingly without necessarily suffering a loss to basal security.

That persons with different levels of basal security can share exactly similar patterns in their three-place trusting relations, though at different psychic costs, means that basal security cannot be reduced to three-place trust. What matters most, however, is not the bare possibility of similarity in three-place trust without similarity in underlying basal security, but rather that if a disruption in three-place trust is the result of a shake to basal security, then different strategies of repair may be needed than would be needed if it were not. The literature in decision theory and mediated dispute resolution offers advice on how to repair three-place trust relations unaccompanied by changes in basal security. Trusted third-party mediators can help reestablish a bridgehead for trust, beginning from a small initial risk. Risk can then be extended incrementally since we do not deliberate extensively about small extensions to previous policy. Likewise, improved communication can make possible trust where once it was not.[22] These strategies can work at reestablishing three-place trust because of the way that they can be targeted toward particular problems, in particular trusting relations. But if the problem is general, rather than particular, then they will be of limited use.

When does basal security need repair? What counts as an appropriate level of basal security? The right level of basal security is a question of *practical* rather than theoretical rationality. We can give a straightforward and general, though not especially helpful, answer to the question of what to *believe* about the degree of risk that one faces in a situation, given one's vulnerabilities. Believe that that degree of risk obtains that is supported by the best available evidence. (Though the appearance that this question of theoretical rationality has such an easy to state, if not to find, answer is somewhat misleading. Given that we are finite agents of limited time and brain power, our theoretical rationality is deeply constrained by practical considerations. It

may not be rational for a particular agent to seek out evidence regarding a particular vulnerability.)

Grant that we should aim at having true beliefs about the risks we face. This does nothing to address the essentially practical question regarding how salient those risks should be on a day-to-day basis and how much they should engage us both motivationally and emotionally. Clearly, one can be *too* focused on vulnerability. As Baier writes, "There are few fates worse than sustained self-protective self-paralyzing generalized distrust of one's human environment. The worst pathology of trust is a life-poisoning reaction to any betrayal of trust" (1994c, 145).

There can be no general answer to the question of what level of basal security is appropriate, as the answer will vary from person to person, depending on each person's level of vulnerability, on the riskiness of the world she inhabits, and on those goals and ends that she has in addition to the end of self-protection. Nonetheless, we can say what makes a given level fall within a range that is appropriate for a particular agent, though identifying this range in the abstract may be of even less use than offering the injunction to believe that that degree of risk obtains that is supported by the best available evidence.

Basal security shapes the agent's perception of those reasons that she has that concern risk and vulnerability where such risk and vulnerability arises from the agency of others. Basal security thus contributes to the agent's ability to frame a choice situation and select from among the complex array of properties that obtain in the situation those that are practically significant, and thus should enter into her deliberation regarding what to do. Basal security is well calibrated just when it enables the agent reliably to latch onto those reason-giving considerations that obtain for her in the kind of choice situations that she faces. But what reasons obtain in a choice situation is a holistic matter and depends on all those ends and values that are implicated in the situation. Basal security will not be well calibrated if it prevents the agent from latching onto considerations that obtain in virtue of the other ends and values that she has. Thus, an agent who is prevented from having intimate relationships that she very much desires because of a tendency to focus on the risks of such relationships has miscalibrated basal security unless something in her history makes her especially vulnerable to the abuses of intimacy, as is the case with survivors of child sexual abuse. Given a history of sexual abuse and the vulnerability it produces, it may be perfectly rational for an agent to have a lower than average level of basal security, since it may be strongly adaptive for such agents to be cautious in their three-place trusting.[23] There are some constraints on the levels of appropriate basal security. Levels of basal security that conduce to the kind of obviousness to risk that endangers life are obvious nonstarters, as are levels that do not allow life to be lived well. However, in between there may be room for wide interpersonal variation.

Understanding how basal security is repaired is necessarily an interdisciplinary task, but by getting clearer about its nature, its practical significance, and its sources of vulnerability, philosophers might make modest contributions to this joint task, if in no other way than by pointing out doomed but potentially tempting strategies.[24] I want to close by doing that. Of all the many personal stories of the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, one that affected me most was a story of a child's symbolic repair of basal security. A seven-year-old boy living in Louisville, Kentucky, spent the afternoon of September 11 making himself a bullet-proof vest out of paper towels and cardboard. He was attempting, in the magical way of a child, to regain control over his suddenly recognized vulnerability. But, magic aside, there was no way open to him to regain such control and so he settled for its symbolic enactment.

Rather than confront the inability of even the wisest of trust practices to protect us from harm at the hands of others, we may be powerfully tempted to regain basal security by settling for the *semblance* of control over that vulnerability. We may do this by supposing that we are better able to divide persons into the trustworthy and the nontrustworthy than we in fact are. Playing on the fear that there might be terrorists among the chiefly Afghani and Iraqi boat people trying to claim asylum in Australia won the Australian prime minister John Howard reelection in 2001. But xenophobia is about as likely to give us control over vulnerability as a cardboard vest is to protect us from a 747, and much less innocent.

NOTES

I would like to thank Annette Baier, Susan Brison, and Jennifer Whiting for comments on this chapter. Special thanks to Peggy DesAutels and Margaret Urban Walker for comments on a draft and for directions to the extensive empirical literature.

1. In "Trust and Anti-trust," Baier characterizes the three-place relation as "A trusts B with valued item C." Holton (1994) offers "A trusts B to do Z," where caring for a valued item is among the actions a person can be trusted to perform. In Jones (1996), I offer "A trusts B in domain of interaction D" as an explication of the three-place relation.

2. For discussion of trust as social capital, see Fukuyama (1995); see also Putnam, Leonardi, and Naretti (1993).

3. Baier offers this definition as a gloss on the account presented in "Trust and Anti-trust" (1994b). It is also affirmed in her paper "Sustaining Trust" (1994a). However, compare her "Trust and Its Vulnerabilities" (1994c).

4. For the notion of "trust responsiveness" see Pettit (1995).

5. For the distinction between predictive and normative expectations, or expectations that and expectations of, see Hollis (1998). That we retain such normative expectations in the absence of predictive expectations suggests that Scanlon's (1998) grounding of the normativity of promises in expectations is at odds with ordinary thinking on the subject.

6. Holton separates trust from reliance as follows, "When you trust someone to do something, you rely on them to do it, and you regard that reliance in a certain way: you have a readiness to feel betrayal should it be disappointed, and gratitude should it be upheld" (1994, 67).

7. The question of whether the neighbors trust or merely rely on Kant was originally raised by Baier in "Trust and Anti-trust" (1994b, 99). It is also discussed in Blackburn (1998b).

8. Compare this analysis with that offered in Holton (1994) "Deciding to Trust," especially at p. 67. The key difference between the accounts is that Holton characterizes the stance of trust (a stance that is itself part of the participant stance) as involving a readiness to feel betrayal or gratitude depending on whether our trust is fulfilled or let down. That a person has a normative expectation is typically evidenced by a readiness to feel such reactive emotions. However, not all betrayals of trust tend to make us feel resentful or betrayed: such feelings are most likely to result when the letdown was the result of ill will rather than simple mistake. Nevertheless, when trust is let down by mistake we do think that an apology is warranted. Normative expectations should thus be thought of as multistranded dispositions, including dispositions to evaluative judgment and to reactive attitudes.

9. For a discussion of the functional virtues of truster and trusted, see Baier (1994a, 1994c).

10. See Herman (1991).

11. See Brison (2002, 46–47).

12. The U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics' "Criminal Victimization, 2002" reports that women and girls aged twelve and older were victims of rape or sexual assault at a rate of 1.8 per 1,000 in the United States in 2002.

13. For the story of Arnold Barnett, a professor of statistics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology who, though aware that the risk of being shot by the Washington sniper was low, continued to feel anxious about the possibility, see Stolberg (2002).

14. This example comes from a rape crisis counselor training program.

15. I call this state basal security because it has echoes of Dillon's (1997) notion of basal self-esteem. Dillon posits basal self-respect to explain belief-independent emotional responses of inadequacy. She writes, "The source of some damage to self-respect is an implicit interpretive framework of self-perception whose organizing motif is worthlessness" (243). Given that I posit basal security to explain our belief-independent emotional responses of security or anxiety and belief-independent dispositions to three-place trust, the structure of our arguments is the same. I call this state basal security because it is clearly related to what Becker (1996) calls "noncognitive security about motives." However, since the basal security comprises cognitive as well as affective dispositions and since those affective dispositions themselves contain a cognitive component, I prefer not to call it "noncognitive security." "Basal security" acknowledges both intellectual debts.

16. For a survey of recent work on the relation between attention and emotion, see Matthews and Wells (1999). For a survey of research on anxiety, including work on the role of unconscious processes in anxiety and fear and on the classification of anxiety disorders, see Ohman (1993). For a comprehensive survey of research on both anxiety and depression, together with a integrative multilevel model that emphasizes

the selective perceptual encoding of threatening information in anxiety, see Williams et al. (1997, especially chapter 11).

17. See Williams et al. (1997, chapters 1 and 9).

18. The first diagnostic criteria for GAD is "[e]xcessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive expectation), occurring more days than not for at least 6 months, about a number of events or activities (such as work or school performance)" (American Psychiatric Association 2000, 476). GAD is differentiated from other anxiety disorders that require specific focus, such as hypochondriasis, in which anxiety is directed at having a serious illness.

19. See American Psychiatric Association's "Anxiety Disorders" (2000). See also Matthews and Wells (1999, 173).

20. For a qualitative study of the effects of the Holocaust, see Bar-On (1995).

21. For this analysis of rape, see Brownmiller (1975).

22. For a discussion of strategies from game theory, see Good (1998). For a discussion of restoring trust that draws on dispute resolution strategies, among others, see Govier (1998, chapter 9).

23. This is an extension and application of the general account of emotional rationality that I develop and defend in Jones (2003). In this essay, I develop a set of contrasting examples focusing on the effects on sexual abuse that aim to show how the appropriateness of suspicion can vary with the agent's vulnerability and with the agent's ends and values. That the question of the correct calibration of basal security is practical rather than theoretical finds further support in the empirical literature on anxiety. In the DSM-IV, the American Psychiatric Association states that anxiety is a disorder when it causes "clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning" (2000, 476).

24. For an account of repair of shattered basal security that focuses on the importance of narrative in remaking the self and for references to the literature on trauma recovery, see Brison (2002).

2

Intimidation

Sandra Lee Bartky

Intimidation, though it pervades our culture, has been neglected in the literature of moral psychology. My chapter has two parts: in the first part, I shall attempt a preliminary characterization of intimidation, only profiling some of the ways it can be embodied. In the second part, I shall offer an extended example drawn from the literature on battered women that brings out the intimidation of certain institutions and environments on which, ironically, the safety and rights of such aggrieved citizens depends.

INTIMIDATION

Intimidation per se is in the most general sense a threat of harm by one or more persons to one or more persons, a warning of bad things to come. If I am a small shopkeeper, visited by the mafia chieftain's lieutenants who warn of bad things to come unless I pay protection money and if I am frightened and pay what they ask, then I have been successfully intimidated. But intimidation can go awry. If their threats fail to frighten me or I stand pat, frightened but nevertheless refusing to pay, and if my store is firebombed as a consequence, then I have been harmed without having been intimidated. Of course, I may now be intimidated by the firebombing itself, taking their threats seriously in a way I may not have before, or I may be no more intimidated than I was in the beginning. I need not feel intimidated; I might feel outraged and vengeful. Thus, a Sartrian would say that it is up to me, in such a situation, whether to allow myself to feel intimidated or not.

In this example, a number of factors are involved in whether the intimidation succeeds: my knowledge of the mafia's methods, its history of success